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Auction Design for Competitive Electricty Markets
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| Robert Ethier, Ray D. Zimmerman, Timothy Mount, William Schulze, Robert J. Thomas
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| Published in the Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference On System Sciences, January 7-10, 1997, Maui, Hawaii.
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An Internet-Based Platform for Testing Generation Scheduling Auctions
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| Ray D. Zimmerman, Robert J. Thomas, Deqiang Gan, Carlos Murillo-Sánchez
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Published in the Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference On System Sciences, January 6-9, 1998, Kona, Hawaii.
This paper describes the uses and architecture of a network-centered computing-rich software platform called PowerWeb. PowerWeb was designed and built as a simulation environment for experimentally testing various power exchange auction markets through tournaments. It is designed to host simulations of a competitive "day-ahead" electric energy market in the context of a restructured electric power industry. The PowerWeb environment is meant to be flexible so as to accommodate different "rules of the game". In this paper we describe its interactive, distributed and web- based character.
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Markets for Electric Power: Experimental Results for Alternative Auction Institutions
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| John Bernard, Robert Ethier, Timothy Mount, William Schulze, Ray D. Zimmerman, Deqiang Gan, Carlos Murillo-Sánchez, Robert J. Thomas, Richard Schuler
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Published in the Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference On System Sciences, January 6-9, 1998, Kona, Hawaii.
The objective of this paper is to present experimental results for testing the performance of different auction mechanisms related to the introduction of competitive markets for the generation of electricity. The research is based on the concept of smart markets introduced by Vernon Smith and a simulation model (PowerWeb) of a realistic bulk power system. There are unique physical aspects associated with the supply of electricity (e.g. required instantaneous matching of supply and demand, unintended congestion of parallel transmission routes and maintenance of system stability in response to disturbances). As a result, traditional theories of efficient markets and auction structures developed for other commodities may not be efficient if applied without alteration to markets for electricity. Conversely, current utility rules of operation developed for a centrally-planned regime may not be appropriate in a competitive environment.
The research does not address the issues of multiperiod operations (unit commitment) and multidimensional markets (ancillary services), and considers only real power in a single time period. The main objective is to test three alternative auction mechanisms when market power is a potential problem. This situation occurs when limits on transmission lines are binding to form a load pocket in which demand is met by a few (in this case two) generators.
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